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THE CORPORATE PATENT - REFORM OR RETROGRESSION?
MARY HELEN SEARSt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CURRENT UNITED STATES PATENT STATUTE imposes
upon inventors generally a personal obligation to participate in
the patent acquisition process, whether or not the patent right has
been assigned.1 'In practice, conscientious discharge of this obliga-
tion provides insurance that the inventor's patent application
includes the complete and accurate description of his invention,
which is minimally prerequisite under United States law to the grant
of an exclusive patent privilege.2 Hence, the obligation effectively
guarantees that the public will receive the full value bargained for if
a patent is granted on the application.3 Over the past decade,
$ A.B., Cornell University, 1950; J.D., George Washington University, 1960;
Member, Virginia and District of Columbia Bars.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1970). Section 111 of the current statute, the Patent Act of
1952 (1952 Act), requires that "[a]pplication for patent shall be made by the inventor,
except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the Commissioner" and further
requires that the application as filed must include "an oath by the applicant as
prescribed by section 115 of this title" and "must be signed by the applicant .. " Id.
Section 115 of the 1952 Act describes the requisites of the oath, an integral part of the
application, which must indicate, inter alia, that the inventor believes himself to be
the original and first inventor of the subject matter covered. Id. § 115. Section 116
specifies that when two or more persons jointly make an invention, they shall jointly
apply for the patent, each sign the application, and each make the required oath. Id.
§ 116. Under current practice, the "oath" may be a declaration or affirmation on
penalty of perjury. 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (1977).
The limited exceptions to the foregoing provisions are available where 1) a
joint inventor refuses to sign the application, 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1970); 2) an inventor is
deceased or legally incapacitated, id. § 117; or 3) an inventor of an assigned
application cannot be located or refuses to sign the application, id. § 118.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. V 1975). The language of this provision emphasizes the
inventor's personal responsibility to insure the correctness and completeness of the
application. Thus, § 112 specifically requires a description of the invention and of "the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." Id. (emphasis
added). In the same vein, the second paragraph requires "one or more claims
particularly pointing out. . . the subject matter which the applicant [i.e., the inventor
as required by § 111] regards as his invention." Id.
Before the 1952 Act, the requirement for signature of the application by the
inventor appeared in the same statutory section as these foregoing requirements. See,
e.g., Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
3. It has been settled since at least as early as Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 1 (1829), that: I
While one great object [of our patent laws] 7as, by holding out a reasonable
reward to inventors and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a
limited period, to stimulate the efforts of geniuS; the main object was "to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts" I ..
Id. at 19, quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emplasis added). The primary public
purpose of the patent system has been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court
(1085)
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Congress has entertained various proposals for patent reform
legislation which have included provisions for assignee filing of
patent applications, whereby inventors would be effectively dimin-
ished to virtual figureheads vis-4-vis assigned patent applications
and the resulting patents.4 The term "corporate patent" as used in
this article, encompasses the proposed provisions in their various
versions.
The proponents of the "corporate patent" concept have to date
justified these proposals primarily on the ground of convenience to
corporate assignees, and on the popular, but ephemeral and
doubtful, premise that inventorship is a "technicality," at least in
the context of corporate research and development., So far, Congress
and the public have apparently assumed that adoption of some form
of a corporate patent would have little, if any, effect upon the
substantive aspects of patent availability and validity, despite the
in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518 (1972); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Serv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917); Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322 (1858); Shaw v. Cooper,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292 (1833).
4. See notes 7-19 and accompanying text infra. These proposed provisions stem
largely from Recommendation V of the Report of the President's Commission on the
Patent System (Commission Report), issued in 1966. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, To
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited
as COMMISSION REPORT]. While the proposed provisions have differed in some
respects, all have provided for the filing of assigned patent applications by assignees
to the exclusion of inventors, and all have dispensed with the requirement of inventor
participation in the actual application for an assigned patent. See notes 13-19 and
accompanying text infra.
5. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23. The Commission itself advances
these premises. See text accompanying notes 20-41 infra. Of the many commentaries
on the Commission Report, only a few have alluded to the "corporate patent"
proposal. For favorable comments on the proposal based on increased convenience to
assignees, see Banner, Observations of a Corporate Patent Attorney on the Report of
the President's Commission on the Patent System, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110, 120
(1967); Banner, The Recent Proposal to Change the United States Patent System, 29
OHIO STATE L.J. 873, 883-84 (1968); Brenner, Testimony in Support of H.R. 5924, 49 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 303, 310 (1967); Holst, A Businessman Views the Report of the
President's Commission, 11 IDEA 37, 41 (1967); McKie, An Analysis of the Proposed
Patent Law Revision Legislation from the Point of View of the Private Practitioner,
51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 757, 760 (1969); Siegel & Schmuckler, Executive Views on
Presidential Commission's Patent Recommendations: Medium-Sized Companies, 12
IDEA 617, 622-23 (1968); Watson, The Patent Reform Act of 1967, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 493, 524-25, 529 (1967); Woodward, Changes in the Patent System Recom-
mended by the President's Commission, 27 FED. B. J. 189, 225-26 (1967); Will New
Patent Laws Help or Mean More Complications, PROD. ENG'R, Mar. 27, 1967, at
164-67.
Some groups have shown little enthusiasm for the "corporate patent"
proposal, but even they have failed to appreciate the substantive, including
constitutional, objections to its adoption. See note 22 infra.
1086 [VOL. 22: p. 1085
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clear inconsistency between the proposals and the literal wording of
the patent clause of the United States Constitution.
6
This article explores the constitutional implications of legisla-
tive implementation of the corporate patent concept, and examines
the extent to which the various proposals might permit sharp
departures from established patent law precepts.
II. THE CORPORATE PATENT CONCEPT
The corporate patent concept is based upon Recommendation V
of the 1966 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent
System (Commission Report).7 The Commission's patent reform
proposal was "one interrelated and coherent plan," composed of
thirty-five specific recommendations to be implemented as a single
legislative package.8 Far from manifesting an intention that the
corporate patent concept could or should be implemented separately,
the President's Commission on the Patent System (Commission)
specifically warned against a piecemeal approach to any of its
recommendations.9
Congress has not heeded this warning. The Commission
Report's "coherent plan" for patent reform legislation was only
briefly considered and shelved.'0 Nevertheless, the specific corporate
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The constitutional patent clause authorizes
Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited
Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries." Id. In
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the
prerogative afforded to Congress by this language is qualified in that only
"discoveries" which "promote progress of science and useful arts" may constitution-
ally be rewarded. Id. at 5-6. By analogy, it is questionable whether Congress may
constitutionally authorize patents that do not have the effect of "securing to ...
Inventors" as distinguished from others, the exclusive patent right.
7. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. Recommendation V of the
Commission Report in its entirety states:
1. Either the inventor or assignee may file and sign both the preliminary and
complete applications. Any application filed by the assignee shall include a
declaration of ownership at the time of filing and, prior to publication of the
application, shall include a declaration of originality by the inventor and
evidence of a recorded specific assignment.
2. Every application shall include, at the time of filing, the name of each person
believed to have made an inventive contribution.
3. Omission of an inventor's name or inclusion of the name of a person not an
inventor, without deceptive intent, shall not affect validity, and can be corrected
at any time.
Id.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. The Commission Report cautioned that: "[A]n attempt to solve or reduce a
problem at one point of the system can expose or create a dislocation at another.
Separate and uncoordinated solutions to individual problems would yield a
gerrymandered patent system full of internal contradictions and less efficient than
the one we now have." Id.
10. See S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The 90th Congress adjourned without
taking any action on this bill. For a comprehensive description of congressional
efforts toward patent reform legislation since 1952, see Scott & Unkovic, Patent Law
1976-1977] 1087
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patent proposal lingers on. Though considerably watered down in
the only patent reform bill passed by either house,11 the proposal will
again be entertained by the 95th Congress in a form similar to that
contemplated by Recommendation V of the Commission Report.
12
The essence of the corporate patent concept was embodied first
in sections 111, 115, 116, and 256 of the initial bills that were based
on the Commission Report and introduced in both houses of
Congress in February, 1967.13 In sum, these proposed provisions
contemplated three changes in the law, viz., they: 1) permitted an
assignee to file a patent application without either the signature or
oath of the inventor and afforded time up to the publication of the
application to identify each of the inventors and supply an oath of
each; 2) permitted an application naming two or more persons as
joint inventors to include claims to subject matter invented by less
than all of the group; and 3) restricted the patent invalidity
consequence of incorrectly designating inventors to cases in which
the error was made with deceptive intent.
14
With only minor changes,' 5 at least two of the essential features
of these proposed sections have appeared in almost every patent
Reform: A Legislative Perspective of an Extended Gestation, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV.
937 (1975). As the authors point out, some of the Commission's recommendations were
opposed by significant segments of the bar and industry as representing unduly
radical alterations of existing law. Id. at 938-40.
11. This bill was passed by the Senate on February 26, 1976. S. 2255, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976). This bill's "corporate patent"
provisions include §§ 111, 115, 116, and 256. Id. §§ 111, 115, 116, 256, 122 CONG. REc.
2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976). This bill has not been acted upon by the House of
Representatives.
12. For example, the American Patent Law Association has already commenced
lobbying for inclusion, in any patent reform legislation actually adopted, provisions
more nearly akin to those contained in §§ 111, 115, and 116 of Senate bill 1042, S. 1042,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and House bill 5924, H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). The Patent, Trademark and Copyright section of the American Bar
Association, at its August, 1975 meeting, specifically disapproved Senate bill 2255, S.
2255, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976), and endorsed
Senate bill 214, S. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 659 (1975), the so-called
"Fong" bill which contained "corporate patent" provisions of the same scope as
Senate bill 1042, S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). SECTION OF PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, A.B.A., SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 67, 76-79,
120-24 (1975) (Annual Meeting at Montreal, Aug. 8-13, 1975).
13. S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
These identical bills were transmitted by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the
Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, President pro tem of the United States Senate, and
the Honorable John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, via
identical letters dated February 21, 1967, with the request that they be introduced as
administration-sponsored legislation. See Patent Reform Act of 1967, 47 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 149 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Act of 1967]. The bills included as attachments
to the letters explanatory commentary relating each of the proposed sections to the
Commission Report. See id. For the entire, identical text of both bills, the associated
commentary, and the text of the accompanying presidential transmittal letter, see id.
14. See Act of 1967, supra note 13, at 171-75, 201.
15. These changes were in part aimed at permitting piecemeal implementation of
the corporate patent proposal outside of the framework of the Commission's overall
1088 [VOL. 22: p. 1085
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reform bill that the Senate has since considered. 16 In 1976 the Senate
passed a bill that incorporated the first and third of the statutory
changes identified above, but in a modified form, more in keeping
with the intent of present law. 17 This bill omitted the second of the
changes identified above.'5 The House of Representatives permitted
the bill to expire upon the adjournment of the 94th Congress, without
hearings or further action.19 Thus the way is clear for the House of
Representatives, which has not yet engaged in deliberations on
patent reform, to plunge into the topic afresh.
reform plan. Id. at 171-75. Some other examples of these minor changes are that:
1) Recommendation VII of the Commission Report contemplated publication of each
patent application within 18 to 24 months of filing. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
4, at 24-25. Some versions of the legislation considered by the Senate have excluded
this early publication provision and have tailored the corporate patent proposal to
permit the assignee who files a patent application in its own name to identify the
inventors and supply the oath of each at any time prior to the issuance of the patent,
or within six months of filing, or at some other specific point after filing and prior to
issuance. See note 16 infra.
2) Similarly, Recommendation V included a proposal to limit patent invalidity for
incorrect inventorship to those instances involving a deliberate intent to mislead.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. However, this was modified in some
proposed bills to place on the patent applicant who erroneously identified the inventor
the burden of correcting the mistake either before or after issuance, with correction
being permitted freely unless a deliberate intention to mislead appears. See note 16
infra.
16. See S. 2255, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976);
S. 1308, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 773, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 23, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2930, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 2504, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 1321, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 643, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 2756,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3892, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); S. 2597, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967); S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). All of these proposed bills
preserved the thrust of the corporate patent concept as set forth in Recommendation V
of the Commission Report. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22, even though they
do differ from the Commission's overall plan in several important respects. See note
15 supra. For the text of Recommendation V, see note 7 supra.
17. S. 2255, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976).
The 1976 Senate-passed bill requires an assignee applicant to identify all inventors at
the time he files the patent application and to obtain their ratification of the
application's content plus the requisite inventors' oaths pursuant to § 115 within two
months of the filing date. Id. §§ 111, 115, 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976).
Senate bill 2255 authorizes the correction of erroneous designations of inventors in
applications and patents provided the facts show there was no "willful default or
intent to defraud, mislead or deceive the public on the part of any of the individuals
• . . named as inventors" or their assignees. Id. § 111(g), 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily
ed. Feb. 26, 1976).
18. The Ford Administration recognized three undesirable consequences of
adopting the second feature, viz., it would "(1) lower the standard of invention; (2)
confuse the prosecution of the application and litigation of the patent; and (3) create a
bias against individual inventors." Letter from Walter D. Scott, Ass't Director for
Economics and Government, Office of Management and Budget, to A. R. Whale,
President, Am. Patent Law Ass'n (Apr. 8, 1975), reprinted in PATENT, TRADEMARK
AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Mar. 4, 1976, at 40 (Special Supp.).
19. The continuing viability of the corporate patent concept, including the feature
which the Senate rejected, is reflected by a September 14, 1976 letter of then Secretary
of Commerce, Elliot W. Richardson, to Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives (Committee). Formal
1976-19771 1089
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III. THE QUESTIONABLE PREMISES FOR THE CORPORATE PATENT
The Commission Report is markedly inadequate in its revelation
of the premises for any of its recommendations, including Recom-
mendation V. While the Commission "held thirteen meetings ...
lasting from one to four days, for a total of thirty-one days," 2° these
meetings were not open to the public. A promised supplement to the
Commission Report, to contain "[b]ackground material prepared by
the staff and the Commission, reflecting more extensively the
considerations taken into account in the development of these
recommendations, ' '21 was never supplied. There is, accordingly, no
available basis on which to evaluate the reliability or completeness
of the information that prompted any of the recommendations,
including Recommendation V.22
The premises for Recommendation V, as expressed in the
Commission Report, at least partially reveal the limited nature of the
notification was made to the Committee of the Commerce Department's specific
espousal of this rejected feature:
The complexities of modern science and technology, coupled with the specializa-
tion of today's engineers and scientists, have resulted in the extensive use of
organized research teams funded by government, industry and the universities.
Cooperative effort of this sort should be encouraged and not penalized by
unnecessary technical requirements with respect to patents for inventions made
jointly by two or more inventors. We urge amendment of section 116 to permit
filing by several inventors where they have jointly contributed to at least one
claim in the application.
Letter from Elliot W. Richardson to Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Sept. 14, 1976), reprinted in
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), Sept. 23, 1976, at A-8 to -9
[hereinafter cited as Richardson letter].
20. Letter from H.H. Ransom and S.H. Rifkind, Comm'n Co-Chairmen to
President Johnson (Nov. 17, 1966), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1967).
21. Id., reprinted in S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
22. Subsequent to the Commission Report, investigators of the Patent, Trade-
mark, and Copyright Research Institute (Institute) found a lack of enthusiasm for the
corporate patent proposal among many interested groups. One investigator noted that
the few firms that have experienced difficulty in locating inventors express
disinterest [in the corporate patent proposal] and a large number of respondents
[to the ongoing investigation] don't see it as an important problem. A few
inventors were suspicious, feeling it might lead to loss of their inventions.
However, most seemed to accept the idea without much concern.
Green, Early Information on the Institutes Study of the President's Commission
Report, 11 IDEA 459, 468 (1968). Subsequently, John C. Green and Gideon Schmuckler
remarked that of 33 universities and 11 research foundations surveyed, "only three of
the universities and none of the foundations, admitted to having had any difficulty in
obtaining an inventor's signature despite the relatively frequent absence of academic
personnel at conferences, on sabbatical leave, et cetera." Green & Schmuckler, The
Presidential Commission's Recommendations: Public Interest Agencies' View, 12
IDEA 764, 773 (1968). Robert B. Bangs, another of the Institute's investigators, found
that
the opinion of inventors was about equally divided as to whether this
recommendation [Commission Recommendation V] was desirable or not ....
The opposition expressed was largely directed to the point that the assignee
1090 [VOL. 22: p. 1085
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study undertaken. 23 The subsequent attention of commentators to
the ramifications of the corporate patent has been at least equally
superficial. 24 The suggestion for assignee filing of patent applica-
tions seems to have been motivated in large part by the Commission
Report's recommendation that patents be awarded to the "first to
file" 25 rather than the "first to invent," as the present statute
requires. 26 A vague impression that inventor filing somehow
promotes delay also appears to have been formed. Thus, the
Commission explained:
Occasionally, inventors are unavailable or unwilling to sign an
application immediately after it is prepared. Moreover, it is
sometimes difficult to determine the identity of an inventor at
the time the application is prepared. Delay in complying with
the requirements has resulted in loss of rights to the application
might file without the inventor.. . . [T]here was a strong feeling that inventors
might lose some status, or claim to special treatment, if this route were followed.
Bangs, Competent Inventors and the President's Commission, 12 IDEA 999, 1008-09
(1969). This author further commented that some inventors
thought the proposal would be helpful primarily to the Patent Bar rather than to
them. Others thought it was primarily the large corporations rather than the
inventors who would benefit.
Running through the responses was a feeling of uncertainty as to how the
simplification was to be achieved; also evident was a residual suspicion that any
simplification might be, at least in part, at the inventor's expense.
Id. at 1009.
Another investigator reported at a June 20, 1968 conference that among the
company executives which he canvassed, it was agreed that "most of the companies
have had no difficulty in persuading inventors to sign patent applications, and a
similar high proportion had experienced no difficulty in locating inventors.
Furthermore, few. (17 out of 50) reported difficulty in determining the actual inventor."
Siegel, Toward the Modernization of Industrial Property in the United States, Part I
- Patent Outlook, 12 IDEA 20, 22-23 (1968).
In sum, one may reasonably infer from these reports that the Commission
formulated its Conclusion V without adequate evidence.
23. For the reasons cited by the Commission, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
4, at 22-23.
24. See, e.g., note 5 and accompanying text supra. Despite the less than
wholehearted enthusiasm for the corporate patent shown by the users of the patent
system, including inventors, many corporate executives, universities, and research
foundations, there has been virtually no in-depth consideration of its impact upon
substantive patent law. See note 22 supra.
25. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 13. Under Recommendation I of the
Commission Report "the patent would issue to the one who is FIRST TO FILE his
application ...." Id. (capitalization in original).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 102 provides in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless - (g) before the applicant's
invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had
not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it. In determining priority of invention
there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and
reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one
who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
Id. § 102(g). See also id. § 135.
1976-19771 1091
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owner. Such delay would be more serious when the effective
filing date is treated as the date of invention.
The intent of this recommendation [for assignee filing] is to
simplify the formalities for filing an application by allowing the
owner of the patent rights to sign and file the necessary papers.
Many detrimental delays thus would be avoided.27
The Commission only paid lip service to a need for "retaining
safeguards to protect the rights of the inventor" 28 and opined that
the requirement that "[b]efore publication of the application ... the
assignee must provide both a declaration of originality and a
specific assignment from the inventor" 29 would effectively be such a
safeguard not only for the interests of the inventor, but also for "the
interests . . .of the public."' 3
While it is exceedingly difficult to speak authoritatively absent
concrete information as to the basis for the Commission's avowed
concern with alleged problems of loss of rights due to filing delays
under present law, that concern seems misplaced. The published
case law and commentary contain no significant evidence that the
present requirement for initial identification of inventors, and for
their participation in the patent application process, has caused any
general loss of patent rights. No doubt specific instances can be
found in which inventor cooperation was sought too close to a
statutory deadline to prevent the loss of rights. 31 And there are
surely instances of loss of patent rights occasioned by mail delays,
unduly postponed attorney action in initial patent application
preparation, human error, and other specific circumstances that
27. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22. For the full text of this
recommendation, see note 7 supra.
28. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 22.
29. Id. at 23.
30. Id.
31. Pursuant to the 1952 Act, such deadlines may arise under at least §§ 102(b), (d),
and 119. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), (d), 119 (1970). Section 102(b) specifies that a patent
may not issue on an application filed more than one year after publication anywhere
in the world, or public use or placing on sale in the United States, of the alleged
invention. Id. § 102(b). Under § 102(d), if the inventor or his assigns have first received
a foreign patent for the same invention on an application filed more than one year
before the United States application, the United States patent is barred. Id. § 102(d).
Under § 119, the United States counterpart of a duly and legally filed foreign
application is treated, in general, as if filed in the United States on the date of the
foreign application, provided the United States application is filed within one year of
the original foreign filing. Id. § 119.
Viewed in the light of these generous one-year grace periods, the Commis-
sion's attribution of loss of rights to "delay" occasioned by the requirement of
inventor filing seems illogical. Certainly there would be few, if any, instances in
which a grace period of one year does not afford sufficient time to permit a diligent
attorney, who plans in advance, to coordinate with the inventor the filing of the
application before the statutory deadline expires.
1092 [VOL. 22: p. 1085
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delayed the inventor's execution of the application and its transmit-
tal to the United States Patent Office until after a statutory deadline.
However, there is no suggestion in the case law or commentary of
any general "delay" phenomenon per se which could justify such a
drastic change as eliminating inventor participation in the applica-
tion.32 Nor is there any evidence to support a suggestion that
legitimatizing assignee filing could prevent delay. It appears far
more likely that those who are unable to file their patent
applications within the relevant statutory grace periods established
in the present inventor filing system would be inclined to cut corners
even more closely on deadlines and have precisely the same
difficulties if assignee filing were permissible.
It seems probable that the word "delay," as utilized in the
Commission Report, was a euphemism for "inconvenience. ' 33 It has
long been argued by patent practitioners, particularly those
employed in corporate patent departments, that the obligation to
identify inventors is burdensome and difficult. 34 Patent practitioners
predominantly engaged in filing United States patent applications
32. But see In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1964). There, in an
unexplained and unelaborated comment, Judge Giles S. Rich, speaking for the court,
asserted that the inventorship provisions of United States patent law create
"complexities and delays which could be avoided under a less rigid statute." Id., citing
35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 116, 256 (1970).
33. One businessman suggested that Recommendation V "recognizes the true
economic interests in patents and the way in which such values are actually made
useful. With reasonable safeguards this provision can be operated to protect inventors
and their rights." Hoist, supra note 5, at 41. This reference to "true economic
interests" is a covert acknowledgement that corporate convenience may be the
touchstone for Recommendation V.
34. For discussion of the alleged problems of identifying inventors, see, e.g.,
Godula, Inventorship in Chemical Patents, 46 ADV. CHEM. SERIES 15 (1964);
Tresansky, Inventorship Determination, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 551 (1974).
It has been suggested that "the modern corporation with its vast research
facilities has caused substantive changes in inventorship entities .... [B]ecause of
the 'research team' approach employed by corporations, an increasing number of new
inventions are developed not through the work of individuals, but rather through
team efforts." Note, The Doctrine of Inventorship: Its Ramifications in Patent Law, 17
W. RES. L. REV. 1342, 1342 (1966) (footnote omitted). See also Roth & Luecke, The
Misjoinder and Nonjoinder Pitfall, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 219 (1967).
The relation of research teams and their work to the patent system was
considered in Potts v. Coe, 140 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1944), but the focus there was upon
problems of invention, not inventorship. Id. at 478.
At least one economist suggested that any system of rewards that focuses on
inventors is anachronistic in this era of corporate research teams and heavy
government funding of research. See Hamberg, Our Antiquated Patent System, 10
CHALLENGE, Jan. 1962, at 24. Contra, Dirlan & Thorkelson, Implications of the
Individualist Theory of Invention, 6 ANTITRUST BULL. 173 (1961) (in rebuttal to an
earlier oral presentation of Hamberg's position). For other discussions of the social or
economic implications of the research team in a variety of contexts, see Blizard, The
Future of Discovery and Invention, 56 TECH. REV. 395 (1954); Gordon, Operational
Approach to Creativity, 34 HARV. Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec. 1956, at 41; Green, Research
Administrators Appraise Proposals to Revise the Patent System, 12 IDEA 778 (1968);
Middendorf & Brown, Orderly Creative Inventing, 76 ELEC. ENG'R 866 (1957); Van
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for foreign applicants have also complained over many years that
the obligation to file an application signed and attested to by the
inventors is inconvenient and difficult to explain to foreign
colleagues, steeped as they are in their own countries' assignee filing
practices. 35 These latter individuals have long urged that they would
be greatly convenienced by authorization to supply the inventors'
ratifications and oaths subsequent to filing the patent application
rather than concurrently therewith.36
Objective 537 and Recommendation XXXV 38 of the Commission
Report afford support for this proposition that the reference to
Deusen, The Inventor in Eclipse, FORTUNE, Dec. 1954, at 132-35; The Engineer and
His Profession, 40 PROD. ENG'R 52 (1969).
The Richardson letter also alludes to an alleged corporate problem of inventor
identification and suggests a sympathetic legislative approach. Richardson letter,
supra note 19.
35. A United States application filed under § 119 - in patent lawyers' parlance, a
"convention" application - is always derived from, and substantially based upon, a
previously filed foreign application. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). In practice,
the foreign application is usually supplied to the United States patent lawyer for use
in preparing an application in the English language and in the proper United States
form. Afterwards it is incumbent upon that lawyer to forward the completed United
States application for signature and execution of the oath by the foreign inventor, in
accordance with §§111, 115, and 116. Id. §§111, 115, 116. See note 32 supra. By
contrast, when an application originally filed in the United States is transmitted to a
foreign country which permits assignee filing, the patent practitioner in that country
simply prepares an application in the appropriate language and form, and then files
it. See, e.g., Neumeyer, Employees' Rights in Their Invention, 83 INT'L LABOUR REV.
36, 47 (1968).
36. Most major foreign countries permit assignee filing and few attach any
importance to the identification of inventors. See, e.g., Neumeyer, supra note 35, at 50.
One significant exception, West Germany, permits assignee filing, but requires the
inventors to be identified and given a share in the proceeds of any patent issued. Id. at
54. Some doubt exists, however, as to whether the term "inventor" has the same
meaning under German law as under current American law, but the point is not
within the scope of this article. See id. at 55.
In general, modem foreign patent systems, like their predecessors, place far
less emphasis upon public rights and public interest and far greater emphasis upon
commercial and marketplace considerations, than does United States patent law. See,
e.g., Robbins, Some Comments on Proposed General Revisions of the Patent Laws, 10
IDEA 579 (1967). Robbins acknowledges that one result of adopting Senate bill 1042, S.
1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), including its corporate patent provisions, would
have been "to convert the United States patent system as it now exists partially..
into a mixed British-European type of patent system." Robbins, supra, at 579.
37. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 12. The Commission Report lists as
Objective 5: "To make U.S. patent practice more compatible with that of other major
countries, wherever consistent with the objectives of the U.S. patent system." Id.
38. Id. at 63. Recommendation XXXV states in its entirety:
The Commission believes that the ultimate goal in the protection of inventors
should be the establishment of a universal patent, respected throughout the
world, issued in the light of, and inventive over, all of the prior art of the world,
and obtained quickly and inexpensively on a single application, but only in
return for a genuine contribution to the progress of the useful arts. To this end
the Commission specifically recommends the pursuit of: (1) international
harmonization of patent practice, (2) the formation of regional patent system
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"delay" in connection with Recommendation V was somewhat inapt
and that "inconvenience" would have been a more accurate term.
Pointedly, Commission Report Objective 5 and Recommendation
XXXV are both directed toward bringing United States patent
practice into congruence with the patent practice of major foreign
countries insofar as possible.3 9 In addition, the Commission Report's
other expressly stated reasons for the corporate patent proposal take
cognizance of the supposed difficulty of determining inventorship in
corporate organizations, as follows:
At present, it is often difficult to determine who should be
named as the inventor in any given application. A contributing
factor is court rulings that for a valid patent to be granted to
joint inventors, each person named must have been a joint
inventor with respect to each claim in the patent.
Many complex inventions result from the combined efforts
of persons working separately, often at different times and in
different sections of an organization. In such cases, adequate
protection cannot be presented properly in a single application,
and the individual contributions cannot properly be made the
subject matter of separate patents.
This recommendation would simplify the initial determina-
tion of who should be named as inventors in a given application
and render it unnecessary for each person named to be the joint
inventor of the invention asserted in each claim in a patent.
40
Still further, the Commission clearly treated inventorship as a
technicality, rather than a substantive requirement at the heart of
the eligibility of the applicant to obtain a patent, either for himself
39. Id. at 12, 64. The Commission Report specifically expresses the conviction
"that harmonization of U.S. practice with prevailing foreign practice. . . should be
introduced as a first step toward..." a universal patent system, and urges that in
this harmonization, "consideration applies both to the substantive law and to the
forms and procedures for implementing it." Id. at 64. The Commission Report does
suggest that efforts be made "to secure harmonization with U.S. practice" when it
"appears to be the superior one" id., but clearly prejudges the issue concerning
inventorship law in favor of foreign practice, without taking cognizance of the
possibility of a constitutional obstacle. See id. The failure to make clear why or how
the conclusion of superiority of foreign inventorship law was reached not only
weakens its impact but suggests that the Commission could not find a justification,
factual or legal.
40. Id. at 23. The suggestion that each person denominated an inventor on the
application need not have participated in the subject matter of each claim of the
patent encompasses radical departures from existing law. See notes 1 & 2 supra. So
far, this fact has received scant attention, notwithstanding that it would tend to
debase "the quality and reliability of the U.S. patent" in direct derogation of the
Commission's noncontroversial Objective 1, which is "to raise ... [that] quality and
reliability . ." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
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or an assignee. In this regard, the commentary accompanying
Recommendation V asserted:
Today, a patent in which a sole inventor is incorrectly
named will be held invalid. In the case of joint inventors, the
omission or improper inclusion of a name will not necessarily
invalidate a patent; however, correction procedures may be
burdensome and the issue of whether correction is required can
become an item of costly litigation.
41
The conclusion that inventorship correction procedures under the
current law "may be burdensome," is not supported by apposite case
law or legal literature. Moreover, the "issue of whether correction is
required" is of dubious existence, 42 and litigation, "costly" or
otherwise, has only occasionally arisen on the issue of whether
correction could properly be permitted.43 The bases for the Commis-
sion's apparently contrary beliefs remain unrevealed. Perhaps most
importantly, the constitutionality of the statutory section permitting
correction has yet to be considered and is open to reasonable doubt.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Constitution is. explicit in empowering Congress to estab-
lish, a patent system solely "To promote Progress of Science and
useful Arts," and in specifying the exclusive means for doing so:
"[S]ecuring for limited Times to. . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective . . . Discoveries .... ,,44
For over 160 years, Congress has clearly manifested its
understanding of this limited constitutional authority by stipulating
in every patent statute effective between 1790 and 1952 that the
inventor apply for the patent, if alive and legally capable of doing
so, even though grant of the patent to an assignee has always been
permitted. 45 On reflection, it becomes apparent that if the inventor
41. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
42. In a real sense, there can be no "issue of whether correction is required."
Under §§ 116 and 256 of the 1952 Act, correction may be granted only sparingly, on
the basis of a good faith showing of facts demonstrating that inventorship misjoinder
or nonjoinder in the application as filed was effected "through error" and "without
any deceptive intention." 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 256 (1970). The issue, therefore, is whether
correction is permitted in order to afford the assignee a right against the public
which, but for the correction, would be null and void.
43. For a list of the relatively few cases which determine whether correction
might be permitted in particular situations based on specific facts presented, see note
129 infra.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1790 required that application for a patent be
made by "petition ... to the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of
war, and the Attorney General of the United States, setting forth that he, she, or they
[VOL. 22: p. 10851096
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files the application and himself insures and attests to the accuracy
of its description of his invention, the "exclusive Right" in that
invention is "secured" to him. In such event, it becomes unimportant
whether or not he designates someone else, such as an assignee, to
receive and enjoy the resulting patent. The relevant legislation since
1790 demonstrates that this has been the understanding of Con-
gress.
46
While the Patent Act of 1952 (1952 Act)47 deviates slightly from
the strict requirements of the preexisting law for inventor filing, 48 its
deviations are of restricted scope and localized consequence, and the
great preponderance of fact situations continue to be governed by
hath or have invented or discovered" the subject matter sought to be patented. Patent
Act, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). However, it authorized the grant of the patent "to
such petitioner or petitioners his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns ....
Id. (emphasis added).
The same mode of application was required by § 1 of the Patent Act of 1793,
which likewise authorized patent grants to assignees. Patent Act, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat.
318 (1793). Section 3 of that statute further provided that "every inventor, before he
can receive a patent, shall swear or affirm, that he does verily believe that, he is the
true inventor or discoverer" of the subject matter in issue. Id. § 3, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
This section was the statutory ancestor of the present requirement of the 1952 Act of
an oath by the inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1970).
The Patent Act of 1836 permitted "any person or persons having discovered or
invented" certain subject matter to "make application in writing to the Commissioner
of Patents . . . ." Patent Act, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Section 7 also required a
written description of the invention that pointed out, inter alia, "the part,
improvement, or combination, which he [the inventor] claims as his own invention or
discovery," and further required him "to make oath or affirmation that he does verily
believe that he is the original and first inventor or discoverer ... " Id. § 7, 5 Stat. 117
(1836). Section 5 of the statute authorized patents to be issued to an assignee of the
inventor. Id. § 5, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). Notably, § 7 required the inventor to make a new
oath or affirmation each time he elected to continue to prosecute the application in
face of a rejection from the Patent Office based on prior art or prior invention
grounds, and thus insured inventor participation in every stage of patent acquisition.
Id. § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
The Patent Act of 1870, in § 26, compelled the "inventor or discoverer" to
make the application. Patent Act, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). Section 30 required
an oath of the inventor's belief in the originality and priority of his inventorship. Id.
§ 30, 16 Stat. 198 (1870). Section 33, not unlike previous patent acts, permitted
assignees to receive the patent grant. Id. § 33, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
Section 26 was amended in 1915 and 1930 without affecting its essential
requirement that the inventor file and sign the application. See Patent Act, ch. 94, § 1,
38 Stat. 958 (1915); Patent Act, ch. 312, § 2, 46 Stat. 376 (1930).
Although patent laws prior to 1908 did not explicitly authorize the legal
representative of a deceased, insane, or otherwise legally incapacitated inventor to
apply for a patent on behalf of the inventor, the courts had always considered the
right to so act to be inherent in the statutory provisions. See, e.g., Eagleton Mfg. Co. v.
West, Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 111 U.S. 490 (1884). The Patent Act of 1908 expressly
conferred the right to apply for a patent and to make the required oath on the executor
or administrator of a deceased inventor, or the legally appointed guardian of a legally
incapacitated inventor. Patent Act, ch. 188, § 4896, 35 Stat. 245 (1908). This provision
is presently codified in § 117 of the 1952 Act. 35 U.S.C. § 117 (1970).
46. See note 45 supra. See also note 50 infra.
47. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
48. See id. §§ 116, 117, 118 (1970).
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the inventor filing requirement. 49 The broad-based corporate patent
concept for the first time assumes that Congress has the power to
redefine the word "Inventors" in the patent clause, in derogation of
the consistent legislative interpretation of that clause from 1790 to
the present, so as to make the term embrace all assignees under any
circumstance whatever.
Proponents of this sharp departure from existing law apparently
overlook the separate status accorded inventors and assignees in
patent statutes from 1790 to the present, as well as in the courts. 5°
They also overlook the primary public interest in obtaining a full,
complete, and accurate description of the alleged invention directly
from the inventor5 ' - the person or persons who are responsible for
the existence of the subject matter sought to be covered by the
patent. To permit assignee filing, with subsequent inventor ratifica-
tion and verification, is perforce to permit the assignee to impose its
notion of what the invention should be upon the description given in
the application, and thus, to derogate the importance of a full,
complete, and accurate description of the invention as made and
perceived by the inventor.52 Assignee filing would invite a variety of
trespasses against the requirement for such a description of the
invention.
53
49. Id. §§ 111, 115, 116.
50. For example, in Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646 (1846), the Supreme
Court remarked that, in adopting certain patent legislation,
Congress had not at all in view protection to assignees [of patents] .... [T]heir
condition on account of dealing in the subject of the invention, whether
successful or otherwise, was not in the mind of that body, nor can any good
reason be given why it should have been.
They had purchased portions of the interest in the invention, and dealt with
the patent rights as a matter of business and speculation; and stood in no
different relation to the government or the public, than other citizens engaged in
the common affairs of life.
Id. at 678 (emphasis added). Consonantly, a patent issued on an application made by
a partnership was held "illegally issued ... and void" because "neither the
application nor the statutory oath in support thereof was 'signed by the inventor' in
any true sense, or within the meaning of the applicable statute." Brewer-Tichenor
Corp. v. American Forging & Socket Co., 300 F. 335, 336 (E.D. Mich. 1924). Similarly,
in Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665
(1942) (en banc), the California Supreme Court noted that a corporation may not
validly file a patent application, since that right is "a personal privilege" available
only to natural, as distinguished from fictional, "persons." Id. at 772, 128 P.2d at 677.
To the same effect, see Leonard v. Shepherd, 99 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 63, 67 (Pat. Off. Bd.
Intfs. 1947). See also United States Gypsum Co. v. Bestwell Mfg. Co., 15 F.2d 704, 705
(N.D. Ill. 1925) (employer has no right to designate as the "inventor," for purposes of
filing a patent application, any person who did not actually participate in making the
involved invention, and a patent based on an improper application is void).
51. For cases emphasizing the primacy of the public interest, see note 3 supra.
52. See note 2 supra.
53. For example, an inventor confronted with a request to ratify and attest to an
already filed patent application signed by the assignee which described the invention
in a materially incomplete or inaccurate way would have a difficult choice regardless
of whether he elected ultimately to accommodate the request or refuse it. To explicate,
1098
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The first patent case to reach the Supreme Court, Evans v.
Eaton,5 4 evidences an appreciation of the necessary relationship -
both under the Constitution alone and as it was interpreted by
Congress in early patent legislation - among the inventor, the
subject matter invented or discovered, and the statutory requirement
for a complete and accurate description thereof, including a specific
differentiation of the patented subject matter from prior inven-
tions.55 The Court in that case recognized an opportunity to
determine broadly whether the patent clause of the Constitution
permits the Congress to designate a particular individual as an
inventor.5 6 Declining to do so directly, the Court ruled that the
specific act before it - a private law enacted solely for the relief of
Oliver Evans - did not expressly denominate Evans an "inventor,"
but rather granted him an exclusive right to any "invention" he
ratification and verification of a materially incomplete or inaccurate description
would open the inventor to possible prosecution for perjury, and would subject the
improperly ratified and sworn application to invalidation because of noncompliance
with the requirement now embodied in § 112 of the 1952 Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. V
1975), or fraud, or both. Refusal to sign, however, would carry with it a risk of an
expensive breach of contract suit by the assignee. In addition, the assignee of an
application which the inventor refused to ratify would be faced with the difficult
problem of determining whether to persist and attempt to show that the refusal of
ratification was improper, or to refile the application in accordance with the
inventor's own understanding of the invention, thereby running risks that interven-
ing statutory bars or other impediments might prevent issuance of a valid patent. See
id. § 102 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). It must be expected that a significant proportion of
inventors would simply ratify and make oath to an already filed patent application
presented by an assignee on what amounts to a "rubber stamp" basis, without
significant inquiry into the accuracy and completeness of the application. The
justification, in large part, would be real or imagined psychological pressure from the
assignee. But it must be expected that the essential depersonalization of the
application process under an assignee filing system would also take its toll in reduced
inventor awareness and concern for the correctness and completeness of the
application.
It can be argued that even with the present inventor filing requirement, the
incidence of inventor concurrence in the content of applications prepared by assignees
is scarcely more than negligible because of real or imagined psychological coercion.
Whether or not this is true - and certainly there are isolated instances where
inventor concurrence has been given unwisely - one must expect that the incidence
would be increased under an assignee filing system. Thus, the assignee would have
greater reason to resort to coercive tactics to avoid the inherent pitfalls of refiling
already noted above. Similarly the inventor would no longer be able to argue, as he
always can so long as inventor filing is required and he must see the application
before filing, that alterations may easily be made. So long as inventor filing remains
the general rule, moreover, it is frequent - even usual - for the attorney preparing
the patent application to confer with the inventor about the content of the application.
Often one or more drafts are exchanged and discussed before the application is placed
in final form for filing. A statutory authorization for assignee filing would remove
much of the impetus for prefiling consultations with the inventor, and would transfer
to the assignee's business people a greater share of responsibility for the scope and
content of the application as filed.
54. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818).
55. Id. at 517-18.
56. Id. at 513-14.
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might have made,57 and left open for determination under the
general patent laws the issue of what had been invented.58 As the
Court put it, "[t]he real inquiry is, does the patent of Oliver Evans
comprehend more than he has discovered?" 59
By thus limiting and articulating the issue in the Evans v.
Eaton dispute, the Court implicitly emphasized the essential
inconsistency of denominating any person as an "inventor" of
"more than he . . .discovered."60 Clearly presuming that Congress
did not intend such illogic, the Supreme Court interpreted both the
general patent law of 1793 and the special patent act for the relief of
Oliver Evans to avoid it.61
In the second Evans v. Eaton62 case, the Court concluded that
the patent was void for failing to distinguish the improvement
Evans made from the known prior art, and thereby implicitly failing
to inform the public of the limits of the patent.63 This requirement
that the application "particularly point out and distinctly claim
what the applicant regards as his invention" 64 appears in section
112 of the current patent act,65 and appeared in the same section as
the requirement that the inventor sign the application in all
predecessor patent statutes.
66
The general Patent Act of 179367 interpreted in the Evans v.
Eaton cases,68 like its predecessor Patent Act of 1790,69 was enacted
essentially contemporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution
57. Id. at 513.
58. In this regard, the Court specifically stated:
Without inquiring whether Congress, in the exercise of its power "to secure for
limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries," may decide the fact, that an individual is an author,
or inventor, the court can never presume Congress to have decided that question
in a general act, the words of which do not render such a construction
unavoidable. The words of this act do not require this construction. They do not
grant to Oliver Evans the exclusive right to use his invention, discovery, and
improvements; leaving the question of invention and improvement open to
investigation, under the general patent law.
Id. at 513, quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
59. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 514.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 515-17.
62. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822). This case was an appeal from the trial that
followed the Supreme Court's earlier remand. Id.
63. Id. at 433-34. "Prior art" in patent parlance is a convenient term that
embraces all relevant scientific or technical information made available by the patent
statutes to defeat, or limit the scope of, a patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101- 103 (1970).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. V 1975). The "applicant" is the "inventor" under §§ 111,
115, and 116 of the 1952 Act. Id. §§ 111, 115, 116 (1970).
65. Id. § 112 (Supp. V 1975).
66. For a discussion of the United States patent statutes, see note 45 supra.
67. Patent Act, ch. XI, 1 Stat. 318 (1793); see note 45 supra.
68. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 496, 502-04; 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 429-30.
69. Patent Act, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); see note 45 supra.
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by a Congress which included a significant contingent of constitu-
tional framers. These statutes and their interpretation in the courts,
including the Supreme Court, are recognized as particularly
persuasive of constitutional meaning.
70
The constitutional patent clause itself, and these early subser-
vient patent laws, must be viewed in the context of the larger
concern for the individual rights of liberty and property which
distinguish the American governmental experiment from the
antecedent political systems with which the constitutional framers
were familiar. More pointedly, in pre-Revolutionary England, and in
Europe for some centuries before the adoption of the United States
Constitution, the right to practice a given art or trade was not only
the assigned property of a guild, but was denied to all ordinary
citizens ineligible for membership in the requisite guild. 71 Early
patent systems on the European continent arose largely because
some alert and forward looking rulers perceived the stagnation of
the arts and trades under guild domination and sought to encourage
creative individuals to produce improved articles and methods in
exchange for the "patent" right - an exclusive privilege of limited
duration which permitted its recipient to exploit his invention,
notwithstanding the existence of a conflicting guild monopoly.7 2 In
return for this "patent" privilege, the patentee was required to
instruct other citizens of the realm in making and using the thing
invented. 73
The first European "patent" systems originated prior to the
invention of the printing press, at a time when a requirement for a
written description or disclosure of the invention would have been
impractical - even unthinkable.7 4 In addition, the central interest of
autocrats, however enlightened, was in furthering their personal
fortunes and those of their closest associates by increasing trade and
commerce. To that end the early European patent right was
available only for articles of manufacture or processes in commer-
70. See Gambrell, The Constitution and the In Personam Defense of First
Invention, 39 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 791, 810 (1957), citing Miller, Comment on the
Intention of the Framers of the Constitution, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 148, 151 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Irons & Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention - The
Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653, 659. For a thorough
description of the guild system, its operation, and evolution, commencing with Roman
emperors in the third century, see V. MUND, MONOPOLY - A HISTORY AND THEORY
(1932).
72. Irons & Sears, supra note 71, at 660.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545 to 1787, 26 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711, 714-15 (1944).
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cially usable form, with the capability for immediately enhancing
the trade, commerce, and wealth of the realm.
7 5
Early English patent grants were in large part similarly
motivated, but in addition, England, as an island, was particularly
concerned with improving its domestic manufacture in the interests
of its trade. It elected to reward not only those exhibiting creativity
by originating inventions, but also those with sufficient courage and
initiative to find and import into the English realm new inventions
from other parts of the world.7 6 The American colonists were
particularly aware of the notorious Elizabethan abuses of patents,
which continued into the reign of James I and even after adoption of
the Statute of Monopolies, involving free grant to court favorites of
exclusive control over old commodities in derogation of public
right.7 7 Many colonists emigrated from England and continental
European countries, not only to avoid religious and political
persecution, but in the hope of achieving freedom from these
"patents," guild monopoly restraints, and other inhibitions on the
economic endeavors of the individual.
7 8
75. Federico, Origin and Early History of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 292,
292-93 (1927). For detailed descriptions of the emergence of patent systems on the
continent, see generally B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
LAW (1967); Federico, supra; Irons & Sears, supra note 71; Mandich, Venetian Patents
(1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 166 (1948); Prager, supra note 74; Prager, The Early
Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 106 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Early Growth]. These writings describe, inter alia, the adoption
of a formal patent system in the city-state of Venice as early as 1474, and they reflect
the even earlier existence of less formalized procedures for granting patents in Venice
and in other places on the European continent. See, e.g., Irons & Sears, supra note 71,
at 659-62.
76. See, e.g., Federico, supra note 75,-at 292-93. There is evidence that patents
were granted in England as early as the thirteenth century, during the reign of
Edward III. Id. at 293. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the English patent
system, see B. BUGBEE, supra note 75; H. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS (1947). See
also Federico, supra note 75; Early Growth, supra note 75.
77. B. BUGBEE, supra note 75, at 12-48; H. Fox, supra note 76, at 127-89. The
Statute of Monopolies did not, as popularly supposed, abolish all monopolies and
patents within the English realm. It preserved patents for original inventions and
importations, and retained the various forms of monopolies, designated as "patents,"
charters, and franchises, which guaranteed exclusive trading and manufacturing
privileges to various guilds and associations. See Irons & Sears, supra note 71, at 662
& n.39. Notwithstanding the adoption of the statute, which purported to abolish the
power of the Crown to grant "patents" arbitrarily on all manner of old commodities,
English sovereigns continued to exercise the power for at least fifty years thereafter,
thus precipitating political unrest in England which became so pronounced at one
point that a brief civil war ensued. See B. BUGBEE, supra note 75, at 12-48; H. Fox,
supra note 76, at 127-89.
78. Irons & Sears, supra note 71, at 663-64. The American colonies adopted laws
guaranteeing individual rights and liberties which condemned all monopolies except
those granted for new inventions and recognized the right of every individual to use
his talents and skills in pursuit of a trade. See id. at 664-66. For a verbatim collection
of the early laws enacted in the colonies, see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1971). Of particular interest are the Body of Liberties,
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The Supreme Court noted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 79 "[i]t
was a monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution."'0 Resentment
of this and other English monopolies that inhibited colonial trade
and commerce and taxed ordinary life was undoubtedly an
important factor in the Declaration of Independence and the
decision to form a new country.81 It must further be remembered that
the colonists' desire to protect individual rights of liberty and
property ran so high at the outset that agreement could be reached
only for adoption of a weak form of national government.8 2 The
existence of strong antimonopoly feelings among the constitutional
framers and many of their politically active contemporaries can be
seen in the various writings debating the desirability of ratifying the
Constitution, which appeared within a period of several years after
its proposal to the states.8 3 A particularly eloquent summation of
American concepts of "property and liberty" - concepts which were
downright radical in the prevailing world political climate of their
day - was written by James Madison and published in 1792.84 In
this work, Madison defined the inherent property rights of every
individual to include "the free use of his faculties and free choice of
the objects on which to employ them."8 5 Madison particularly
adopted in Massachusetts in 1641. See id. at 61-84, quoting MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF
LIBERTIES (1641), contained in W. H. WHITMORE, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, 1672, at 33-46 (1890). The Frame of Government, adopted by the
colony of Pennsylvania in 1682, is also noteworthy. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at
132-44, quoting W. PENN, PENNSYLVANIA FRAME OF GOVERNMENT art. XII (1682),
contained in 5 THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3052-63 (1909).
79. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
80. Id. at 7.
81. See id. at 7-8.
82. Immediately after the Declaration of Independence, virtually all of the
individual colonies adopted declarations or constitutions setting forth guarantees of
individual liberties and rights to property. For the full text of each promulgation, see 1
B. SCHWARTZ supra note 78, at 175-379. Various colonies, including Maryland and
North Carolina, condemned monopolies as a matter of principle in their declarations.
See id. at 284, quoting MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXXIX (1776),
contained in 3 THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1687-91 (1909); 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78
at 288, quoting NORTH CAROLINA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XXIII (1776),
contained in 2 POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1409-11 (1877). No
doubt it was the strong feeling in favor of individual rights and of permitting people
to pursue their lives with the least possible governmental interference, that led to the
adoption of the wholly ineffectual central government established by the Articles of
Confederation. Irons & Sears, supra note 71, at 667.
83. In addition to THE FEDERALIST, a number of pamphlets were circulated by
many politicians of the day. See, e.g., Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States, reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
435-620 (1971); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION (P.L. Ford ed. 1888). See also THE
COMPLETE MADISON (S.K. Padover ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as MADISON]; THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (H.A. Washington ed. 1861).
84. MADISON, supra note 83.
85. Id. at 267, quoting National Gazette, March 29, 1792.
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emphasized that there can be no "just government ... where
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its
citizens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their
occupations, which not only constitute their property in the general
sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly
so-called . 86... 86
Clearly, Madison, one of the primary drafters of the Constitu-
tion, did not envision that the patent clause would ever permit the
Congress to create or tolerate monopolies akin to those enjoyed by
the guilds, which did deny to citizens the "free use of their faculties,
and free choice of their occupations . . ... 7 Equally clearly,
Madison and other constitutional framers believed that the patent
clause would foreclose Congress from creating arbitrary, exclusive
privileges akin to those afforded by English absolute sovereigns.
Madison and his fellow framers also certainly believed that no
statute was needed under the Constitution for an inventor to exercise
freely the right to make, use, sell, and profit from the fruits of his own
creativity.88 Rather, the purpose of a patent statute was intended to
be to "secure" to the inventor an exclusive right of limited duration
to prevent others from practicing or enjoying his invention without
his express authorization, during the life of the right.
To insure that the authorization contained in the patent clause
would be recognized for what it was - an exception to the general
disfavor of monopolies - the words of the patent clause were strictly
limited. The limitations concerning "securing for limited Times to
. . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries"89 are
manifestly of no less significance and are to be construed no less
rigorously than the limitation implicit in the stated purpose - "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . .,,0
The concept of permitting the modern corporation to amalgam-
ate in one patent application the results of the collective efforts of an
86. MADISON, supra note 83, at 269, quoting National Gazette, March 29, 1792.
87. MADISON, supra note 83, at 269, quoting National Gazette, March 29, 1792.
88. MADISON, supra note 83, at 267-69. The Supreme Court in Crown Co. v. Nye
Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1922), and Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1912), recognized
the common law right of individual citizens of the United States to make, use, and sell
their own inventions on a nonexclusive basis. 261 U.S. at 35; 229 U.S. at 10. Under the
patent laws, the right is somewhat qualified by the fact that the inventor of an
improvement upon an existing patented invention may not exercise his right to enjoy
his own invention in a manner that infringes a valid dominating patent. See Bement
v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
202, 238 (1841).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90. Id. The Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), relied
upon the early American abhorrence of monopoly to conclude that the patent clause
"is both a grant of power and limitation," a "qualified authority" to legislate which
imposes "restraints" upon the congressional exercise of the patent power. Id. at 5-6.
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entire team with a broad research assignment and to preempt an
integral segment of technology as an "invention," in a single
''patent," is closely related to the medieval concept of the guild
monopoly. 91 That concept is far removed from the constitutional
concept of promoting individual creativity by securing to the
inventor who fully discloses his invention, and thereby advances
public knowledge, a limited, exclusive right with which to bargain in
the marketplace for whatever economic reward his invention might
merit. 92
The evolution in England and on the Continent of guilds and
exclusive trading companies into modern "chartered" corporations
had already commenced when the United States Constitution was
adopted. 93 Notwithstanding the preeminently agrarian character of
18th century American society, it must be presumed that the
constitutional framers, many of whom were well educated and had
traveled to England or the Continent, recognized as inevitable the
eventual obtrusion of corporate institutions into the American
milieu. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the word "Inventors"
was intentionally utilized in the Constitution in a limiting sense,
and that the word cannot be ignored in designing modern
legislation. Moreover, the concept of assignment of property was
well understood contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Constitution, as evidenced, inter alia, by the use of the word
"assigns" in the Patent Acts of 179094 and 1793.95 If the Constitu-
tional Convention had seen merit in "securing" any rights to the
"assigns" of inventors, it would have been an easy matter to word
the patent clause to insure that result. The omission of reference to
persons other than inventors, such as financiers and employers,
must, therefore, be deemed deliberate and limiting.
Because patent legislation to the present - apart from the
limited deviations in the 1952 Act discussed hereinafter 96 - has
closely tracked the inventorship requirement in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has had no real occasion to consider any seemingly
aberrant statute. The question of whether the language of the patent
clause could permit Congress to legalize filing by an entire class of
noninventors, such as assignees, has not arisen. Decisions rendered
by the Court before 1900 on the propriety of patent applications by
91. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
92. See, e.g., Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d
514, 516 (5th Cir. 1975).
93. See generally V. MUND, supra note 71.
94. Patent Act, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
95. Patent Act, ch. IX, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
96. See notes 126-133 and accompanying text infra.
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noninventors interpret the language of the extant patent laws,
rather than that of the Constitution because there was no hint of
inconsistency.9 7 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Court twice
held that a patent granted on an application of a noninventor is null
and void, rather than invalid, because the underlying application is
a nullity.98 In Kennedy v. Hazelton,99 the Court refused to compel
assignment, pursuant to a written agreement, of a purported
"patent" that had been granted on the application of a person who
was procured by the inventor to file, sign, and swear to the
application in an effort to evade an assignment contract.0 0 The
Court reasoned that since the patent law requires the patent to be
"granted on the application, supported by the oath, of the original
and first inventor, (or of his executor or administrator) . . . ," a
patent granted on the application and oath of another individual is a
nullity, incapable of conveying any right, much less of being
assigned.101
In Eagleton Manufacturing Co. v. West, Bradley & Cary
Manufacturing Co.,102 a patent issued on an application materially
amended subsequent to the death of the named inventor was held
null and void because the amended description of the invention
differed so markedly from the original description that the
perpetrator of the amended description was deemed to be the true
inventor of the patented subject matter. 1 3 The Court reasoned that
since neither the named inventor nor the originator of the different
amended description had signed and sworn to the latter, the
amended application was a nullity, incapable of supporting the
erroneously granted patent.
10 4
Even before either of these two decisions, the rules of the Patent
Office, adopted December 1, 1879, implicitly recognized the nullity of
applications "signed or sworn to in blank, or without actual
inspection of the petition and specification, or altered or partly filled
up after being signed or sworn to," and required that they be
97. See Kennedy v. Hazleton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888); Eagleton Mfg. Co. v. West,
Bradley & Cary Mfg. Co., 111 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1884).
98. In other words, the Court distinguished these void patents from patents
granted upon the proper signature and oath of a bona fide inventor but later found to
be invalidated by prior art of which he had no knowledge when the oath was given.
For a discussion by the Court of invalid patents generally, see, e.g., Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
99. 128 U.S. 667 (1888).
100. Id. at 671-73.
101. Id. at 672.
102. 111 U.S. 490 (1884).
103. Id. at 498.
104. Id. at 499.
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stricken from the files "upon the discovery of such irregularity."105 A
parallel provision of the present rules permits, but does not require,
the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (Patent Commis-
sioner) to strike a patent application in any of the same circumstan-
ces, or when any fraud has been practiced. 10 6 These rules are part
and parcel of the principle of the Kennedy and Eagleton decisions -
i.e., that an application not signed and sworn to and otherwise
approved by the inventor before filing is a nullity. The lower courts
have not always distinguished between void and invalid patents in
applying this principle, but they have, virtually without exception,
adhered to its substance.
10 7
105. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 31 (1897). Decisions reflecting the
implementation of this and other early rules, though collected in bound volumes in the
Patent Office, have not been made publicly available. See Irons v. Gottschalk, 548
F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1970) (as amended 1974).
106. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1975). As recently as February 25, 1977, the Patent
Commissioner ruled that an application not read by one of the three coinventors prior
to his execution thereof should be stricken from the files, noting that the primary
reason for the errant coinventor's laxity was a desire to expedite filing of the
application. PATENT TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA), Mar. 10, 1977, at
A-11. The Patent Commissioner commented: "Such haste.., cannot be condoned as
an excuse for failure to read, with reasonable care, a specification ...." Id. at A-12.
Ironically, comparable "haste" on the part of assignees is one of the excuses
advanced by the Commission Report for the adoption of laws permitting assignee
filing. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. No legislative hearings to date have
directly confronted the question of whether haste on the part of assignees can "be
condoned as an excuse for" any activity resulting in the inventor's failure to read a
:specification with reasonable care. Yet, the assignee filing proposal would permit
assignees to effect indirectly what inventors have expressly been prohibited from
doing directly for at least a century - to file a patent application that the inventor
has never read which may not correctly or completely describe the alleged invention.
107. See, e.g., Cummings v. Moore, 202 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1953); Kendall Co. v.
Tetley Tea Co., 189 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1951); International Carrier Call & Tel. Corp. v.
Radio Corp., 142 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1944); Chemical Foundation v. General Aniline
Works, 99 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1938); Standard Oil Dev. Co. v. James B. Berry Sons Co.,
92 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1937); Duplex Envelope Co. v. Denominational Envelope Co., 80
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1935); Tin Decorating Co. v. Metal Package Corp., 37 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1930); Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, 29 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1928); George v. Perkins, 1
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1924); Craig Demagnetizer & Ink D. Corp. v. Static Control Co., 295
F. 72 (2d Cir. 1923); Joseph Ross & Co. v. Wigder, 290 F. 788 (3d Cir. 1923); McKinnon
Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 268 F. 353 (7th Cir. 1920); American Lava Co. v.
Steward, 155 F. 731 (6th Cir. 1907); Murjahn v. Hall, 119 F. 186 (C.C.N.Y. 1902);
American Elec. Novelty & Mfg. Co. v. Newgold, 108 F. 957 (C.C.N.Y. 1901); Royer v.
Schultz Belting Co., 40 F. 158 (C.C. Mo. 1889); Streat v. White, 35 F. 426 (C.C.N.Y.
1888); Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F. 665 (C.C. Ill. 1887); Milligan v. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg.
Co., 21 F. 570 (C.C.N.Y. 1884); Air-Shields, Inc. v. Air Reduction Co., 331 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1973); Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co.,
Inc., 254 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Saul v. International Harvester Co., 170 F. Supp.
374 (E.D. Wis. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 361 (7th Cir. 1960); John Blue Co. v. Dempster Mill
Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp. 23 (D. Neb. 1958), aff'd, 275 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1960); Grindle v.
Welch, 146 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1957); Young v.
General Elec. Co., 96 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Ill. 1951); Sanford Inv. Co. v. Crab Orchard
Improvement Co., 25 F. Supp. 575 (D.W. Va. 1938), aff'd, 104 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1939);
Ney Mfg. Co. v. G.A. Swineford Co., 211 F. 469 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
The misconception that inventorship is a technicality may have its genesis in
statements by many courts that inventorship defects, including inventor misjoinder,
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As recently as 1975, in Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood
Medical Industries Inc.,08 the Fifth Circuit held a patent void for
deliberate misjoinder of inventors, and expressly noted that the
inventor filing requirement is constitutionally based. 10 9 Subsumed
within the broad principle that any patent granted on an application
signed and sworn to by an entity other than the true inventor is
void, is its necessary concomitant, that a patent applied for by more
or less than all of the true inventors of the subject matter covered is
likewise void. 110 This subprinciple was implemented consistently by
the courts prior to the 1952 Act."'
are "technical defenses" in a patent infringement suit. See, e.g., Kendall Co. v. Tetley,
189 F.2d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 1951). A "technical defense," however, is wholly unlike a
"technicality" of law. Careful reading of the case law reveals that defenses based on
inventorship impropriety are considered "technical" not because inventorship is
deemed to be unimportant or nonsubstantive, but because courts strongly presume
that persons who swore solemnly to the fact of their own inventorship did not do so
perjuriously, but acted correctly and in good faith based on the exercise of due care.
See, e.g., id. Hence, the burden upon a party attacking inventorship is heavy, and the
proofs contravening the oath must meet an extremely high evidentiary standard. Id.
But see A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a discussion of
Stoddard, see note 137 infra.
108. 516 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975).
109. Id. at 516. The Court stated that: "Patent-monopoly protection is designed to
reward the creativeness deemed by the Founding Fathers to be of value to the
Republic .... As a corollary, the rule is patent protection may not issue in favor of
persons not responsible for the creation of advances otherwise qualifying for the
specified protection." Id., citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Iowa State
Research Foundation v. Sperry-Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406, 408 (4th Cir. 1971).
110. This subprinciple was codified in the first set of Patent Office Rules adopted
in 1836 when that office was established. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases (1836). The
rule stated: "Joint inventors are entitled to a joint patent, but neither one can claim
separately." Id. On August 1, 1869, the rule was amended to provide that:
Joint inventors are entitled to a joint patent; neither can claim one separately;
but independent inventors of separate improvements in the same machine,
cannot obtain a joint patent for their separate inventions; nor does the fact that
one man furnishes the capital and the other makes the invention entitle them to
take out a joint patent.
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 3 (1869).
In 1878, the rule was amended further to state:
Joint inventors are entitled to a joint patent; neither can claim one separately;
but the independent inventors of separate and independent improvements in the
same machine cannot obtain a joint patent for their separate inventions; nor
does the fact that one man furnishes the capital and the other makes the
invention entitle them to make application as joint inventors.
Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 3 (1878). In 1887, a clause was added
recognizing that a financier and an inventor may be joint patentees, even though they
are not joint inventors. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 28 (1887). A
counterpart of this rule as amended was included in the Patent Office Rules of
Practice in effect until March 1, 1949, whereupon rule 45(a) was substituted. Patent
Office Rules of Practice, Rule 45(a) (1949). This rule, which subsisted until the 1952
Act, stated that: "Joint inventors must apply for a patent jointly and each must sign
the application papers and make the required oath; neither of them alone, nor less
than the entire number, can apply for a patent for an invention invented by them
jointly." Id.
111. See, e.g., Kendall Co. v. Tetley Tea Co., 189 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1951); Larson v.
Crowther, 26 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1928); Joseph Ross & Co. v. Wigder, 290 F.2d 788 (3d
Cir. 1923); Smart v. Wright, 227 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1915). See also note 98 supra.
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Also subsumed within the same broad principle that any
application not filed by the true inventor-entity is void is a second
subprinciple - viz., that an application filed by a larger number of
persons than those who are actual inventors, is a nullity. This
subprinciple was explicitly a part of the relevant Patent Office rules
from 1836 to 1949.112
Logic suggests that the only recourse from a void application,
whether a consequence of filing by too many inventors, thereby
creating a "misjoinder" problem, or too few, giving rise to a
"nonjoinder" problem, is to abandon the null and void application
and file a new application in the name of the correct inventors.
Unquestionably, this logic prevails whenever the error in the
original filing is deliberate, even today.11 3
The question of whether accidental misjoinder of one or more
noninventors in an application also signed by all the actual
inventors is governed by the same strict rule, first arose in In re
Roberts 14 before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. In that case, an appeal from a Patent Office ruling holding
an application to be void because of such inadvertent misjoinder,
115
the court viewed the unintentional error as correctible by simply
amending the original application to remove the surplus noninven-
tors and supplying a new, proper oath. 116 The court accordingly
reversed the Patent Office, holding that the true inventor should not
be forced to file a new application and suffer the consequence of loss
of the orignal filing date ' 7 "merely to correct a formal error."
118
While at first blush there is a seeming inconsistency between
this holding and both the reasoning and express language of the
112. For the text of these rules, see note 110 supra.
113. See, e.g., Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 516 F.2d
514, 516 (5th Cir. 1975).
114. 263 F. 646 (App. D.C. 1920).
115. Id. at 647. The Patent Office not only held the Roberts application void, but
apparently did so with strong conviction. Before the Roberts appeal could be heard,
that office relied upon its own decision to issue a patent on the same subject matter
covered by the Roberts application to a third party who had filed later than Roberts.
See id.
On appeal, the court was no doubt influenced by its recognition of the effect of
this intervening patent which 1) would constitute a prior art bar to the issuance to
Roberts of a patent on a new application filed at a still later date by the true inventor
entity, but 2) could not prevent Roberts from obtaining a patent on the earlier filed
defective application if the defect could be cured by amendment. Id. at 646-49.
116. Id. at 648-49.
117. See note 115 supra. The court's knowledge as to what loss of the original filing
date would mean to Roberts no doubt affected this holding. Specifically, if the original
application date could not have been salvaged by amending the application, Roberts
would not only have lost any hope of obtaining his own patent, he would also have
lost his right to practice his own invention. The latter loss would have followed from
the award by the Patent Office to a third party of a patent conferring the exclusive
right to prevent others, including Roberts, from practicing the involved invention.
118. 263 F. at 648.
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Supreme Court decisions in Kennedy and Eagleton,119 the holdings
can be rationalized. Firstly, inadvertent or accidental error is of a
different character from intentional misrepresentation of known
facts. Secondly, where each of the true inventors has joined in,
signed, attested to, and hence approved the application, the
innocently erroneous inclusion of a noninventor may reasonably be
considered as immaterial surplusage. Early writings on inventor
misjoinder and nonjoinder problems did not consider the question
ruled upon in the Roberts case, and did not suggest a possibility that
the law might justifiably regard unintentional errors in inventor
entity differently from deliberate deceptions. 12°
The so-called "Roberts Rule" gave rise to a spate of related case
law in the Patent Office and its reviewing courts. 121 The Patent
Office eventually adopted a formal rule which permitted the
conversion of a joint application to a sole application upon a
showing that: 1) the error was made without deceptive intention, and
2) the applicant was diligent in making the correction soon after
discovering the error.
122
The relaxation of the strict legal rule to permit correction of
applications in which a superfluous noninventor had been joined
through unintentional error did not prompt a corresponding change
of attitude toward applications in which an inventor had been
inadvertently omitted through error.123 The Patent Office continued
to hold, in the latter nonjoinder situation, that the erroneous patent
119. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
120. See Dew, Joint Applications, 10 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 389 (1927); Relson,
Misjoinder of Inventors In Patent Applications, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 546 (1945).
121. For a comprehensive review of the relevant precedent from the Patent Office
and the reviewing courts from the 1920 Roberts decision to 1945, see Relson, supra
note 120. The author discusses the many different fact situations in which a sole
inventor was permitted to rely upon the filing date of an earlier joint application in
order to obtain a patent that might otherwise have been barred by intervening prior
art. Id. at 548-55. Decisions similar to those discussed in the article were rendered
between its publication date, 1945, and the January 1, 1953 effective date of the 1952
Act. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 4(a), 66 Stat. 815 (1952). Compare In re Field, 161
F.2d 372 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (sole inventor's application held unpatentable over patent
issued on earlier-filed joint application of same inventor and third party), with
Draeger v. Bradley, 156 F.2d 64 (C.C.P.A. 1946) (sole inventor permitted to rely on
filing date of original joint application he and another had erroneously filed).
122. See 263 F. at 647, 649. The first such Patent Office Rule of Practice was
adopted on March 1, 1949 as rule 45(b). Patent Office Rules of Practice, Rule 45(b)
(1949). It permitted removal of the names of one or more erroneously joined joint
inventors from an application upon the requisite showings of diligence and good faith
and presentation of an oath by the true inventor as to his priority and originality. Id.
The rule, nonetheless, expressly prohibited adding the name of an omitted joint
inventor to an application. Id. See note 123 infra.
123. See Ex parte Benes, 1925 Dec. Com. Pat. 75 (1925). See also Patent Office
Rules of Practice, Rule 45(b) (1949). Rule 45(b) states in pertinent part: "An
application can not be amended to add the name of a joint inventor who was omitted,
but a new independent application must be filed." Id.
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application was a nullity. The only remedy available was for all of
the true inventors to file an entirely new application, effective only
as of its own filing date.124 In light of the Kennedy and Eagleton
decisions of the Supreme Court, the Patent Office position was well
taken.12
5
In 1952, however, Congress adopted new statutory provisions
enabling correction of applications involving errors of both inventor
misjoinder and nonjoinder so long as all persons acted inadvertently
and without deceptive intent126 and permitting the correction of
inventorship misjoinder or nonjoinder on issued patents, on a
showing of bona fide mistake and lack of deceptive intent.127 The
legislative history of the 1952 Act revealed that Congress was
remarkably inattentive to the fact that those provisions effected
changes in the law, much less to the constitutional implications of
the changes. 28 There have been relatively few cases decided under
124. 1925 Dec. Com. Pat. at 76.
125. See notes 99-104 and accompanying text supra. See also Wailes Dove-
Hermiston Corp. v. Oklahoma Contracting Co., 48 F.2d 901 (N.D. Tex. 1931), aff'd, 56
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1932). The district court in that case refused to afford a subsequently
filed joint application the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application filed by a
sole inventor. 48 F.2d at 902. To the same effect, see Pinkerton v. Stahly, 144 F.2d 881
(C.C.P.A. 1944).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1970).
127. Id. § 256.
128. The legislative history shows only minimal and trivial discussion of these
important inventorship correction provisions. See Patent Law Codification and
Revision, Hearings on H.R. 3760 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (Sup. Doc. No. Y4.J 89/1:82/no.9) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]. H.R. 3760, in slightly modified form, became the 1952 Patent Act.
In its statement to the subcommittee, the American Patent Law Association
noted that: "Section 116 liberalizes the treatment of applications of joint inventors by
permitting the addition as well as the deletion of a nonjoined or misjoined inventor
and represents a realistic treatment of the many problems arising in the handling of
joint inventions." Id. at 45. The Association further noted that § 206 of the bill, H.R.
3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1951) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1970)):
provides for deletion or addition of a misjoined or nonjoined inventor in the case
of an issued patent and provides that a patent cannot be held invalid for
inadvertent misjoinder or nonjoinder. These are salutory [sic] innovations in the
law since there is no valid reason why a patent should not be corrected the same
as an application in this regard.
Hearings, supra, at 46.
The Department of Justice, which often is quite sensitive to the constitutional
ramifications of proposed legislative changes, did not even allude to the inventorship
correction provisions of the proposed statute in its statement. Id. at 93-98.
Mr. P. J. Federico, testifying for the United States Patent Office, said that
§ 206 of the bill
is a new section in the law that is correlated with Section 116 ... relating to a
mistake in joining a person as a joint inventor. Very often two or three people
make an invention together. They must apply as joint inventors. If they make a
mistake in determining that the third one is one of the three inventors that
actually made the invention, they do so at their peril.
This provision permits a bona fide mistake in joining a person as inventor or
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the correction provisions, 129 and not one has involved the constitu-
tional issue of the power of Congress to enact this legislation. The
1952 Act, as earlier noted, generally preserved the strict inventor
filing requirements of prior law. It relaxed those requirements in
minor respects when an inventor "cannot be found or reached after
diligent effort" 130 or has refused to execute the application for
patent' 3 ' to permit a coinventor or an assignee to file for the missing
or recalcitrant inventor. The record of legislative hearings held
antecedent to the adoption of the 1952 Act reveals that only
superficial consideration was given to the wisdom or constitutional-
ity of departing, even in this minor way, from previous law of over
160 years' standing.
132
Somewhat remarkably, moreover, there seems to have been no
discussion of the possibility that an inventor might refuse to sign
Louis Robertson, a Chicago, Illinois lawyer, submitted a written comment to
the committee that is by implication critical of the proposed provisions in so far as
they contemplated corrections of nonjoinder errors. He said:
The inclusion as applicant of an extra person, i.e., one in addition to the true
inventor, seems to be entirely harmless in all instances except when he himself
would improperly gain by it, and in these instances the possible invalidity of the
patent is often no discouragement to him but only penalizes the real owner who
is innocent.
It would be far better to provide simply: "The naming of an extra person as
applicant or patentee shall be disregarded, except that courts may refuse to
enforce on behalf of such person his apparent rights as copatentee and, if he
dishonestly permitted himself to be named, his rights by assignment. The
Commissioner may strike his name, if satisfied that no claim would be
jeopardized."
Id. at 218.
The hearing record also contains a written statement in which R. S. Ould, a
Washington, D.C. patent practitioner, criticized §§ 116, 118, and 206 of the bill in
extenso. Id. at 223-25. This statement pointed out, inter alia, that "[t]here is no power
conferred by the Constitution on anyone to declare that a person is the inventor, who
in fact is not the inventor." Id. at 223. The thought is not developed, however, and the
statement appears to have been given no thoughtful attention, either in Congress or
elsewhere, at the time.
129. See Borden, Inc. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Azoplate Corp. v. Silverlith, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 711 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d
1050 (3d Cir. 1974); Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F. Supp. 91 (W.D. Mo.
1973); Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Kraftco Corp. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 342 F. Supp.
1361 (D. N.J. 1971); Hamilton Cosco, Inc. v. Century Products, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 1271
(N.D. Ohio 1969); Porter-Cable Machine Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 274 F. Supp.
905 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 402 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1968); Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F.
Supp. 818 (D. D.C. 1967); Koehring Co. v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ill.
1966). See also Roth & Luecke, supra note 34.
130. 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 118 (1970).
131. Id.
132. Specifically, the subcommittee hearings show that only five of the numerous
witnesses even adverted to this change, and then only in passing. Hearings, supra
note 128, at 38, 45, 95-96, 211. P. J. Federico, Examiner-in-Chief of the United States
Patent Office, acknowledged that §§ 116 and 118
introduce a new thing in our law. Our statute is very strict in requiring that only
the inventor may apply for a patent. These two sections provide for certain types
1112 [VOL. 22: p. 1085
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because the version of the application presented to him did not
correctly or completely describe what he had invented, or ascribed to
him an invention he had not made. It is safe to say that Congress
had no idea it was opening the way for patents to be granted on
patent applications that earlier would have been deemed nullities. 13a
Throughout the twenty-five years since the assignee and
coinventor filing provisions of sections 116 and 118 of the 1952 Act
became effective, they have been implemented by the Patent Office
in accordance with its Rule 47.134 This rule purports to impose
rigorous requirements upon the form and content of the fact
presentation necessary to justify the assignee or coinventor filing of
an application in which an inventor has not joined. 135 A 1958 study
revealed there had been infrequent resort to this type of filing during
of situations where it may be impossible for the inventor to apply ...; the
sections provide all of the safeguards necessary for the inventor.
Id. at 38.
The American Patent Law Association expressed an understanding that the
departure from prior law was intended to be invoked only in a situation where "the
filing of an application is necessary to prevent a loss of rights, such as the running of
a public use or the like." Id. at 45. The Association commented further:
The rights of the inventor are safeguarded by providing that the patent will issue
to him so that the section will not invite indiscriminate filing by others than the
inventor and the Commissioner of Patents will not be required to decide any
questions as to the title of rights of an alleged assignee or other person in
interest.
Id.
The Department of Justice also recognized "a new concept heretofore
unknown to the United States patent law" and lauded it as
highly desirable in that it would permit employers, including the Government, to
file applications for patents on inventions made by employees who are
unavailable when an application is ready to be filed. This is not unknown in
these troublous days when many military and other personnel are beyond the
seas when needed for execution of a patent application. The section does not
change any substantive rights. It merely permits the timely filing of an
application by the party who thinks he has an interest therein without in any
way affecting the inventor's rights.
Id. at 95-96.
The only other pertinent comments during the hearings were made by
individual attorneys. Harvey R. Hawgood of Cleveland, Ohio, hailed §§ 116 and 118
as: "a distinct step forward as there have been instances in which inventions have
been lost by arbitrary refusals to sign or by people getting out of contact, particularly
at the end of a period raising a statutory bar." Id. at 211.
The final commentator, R.S. Ould of Washington, D.C., did raise a
constitutional objection. Id. at 223-25; see note 128 supra. He remarked, inter alia,
that the departure from prior law embodied in §§ 116, 118, and 256 "is likely to prove
to be simply an entering wedge to entirely destroy the American concept of
inventorship, and to permit the filing of patent applications in the first instance by an
alleged employer, or assignee, thus converting the patent system entirely into a
system of property rights." Hearings, supra note 128, at 224.
133. The Reviser's Note accompanying the bill at enactment does, however,
emphasize the limited ambit of the applicability of § 118 by its assertion that "[t]his
section is new and provides for the filing of an application by another on behalf of the
inventor in certain special hardship situations." Reviser's Note, 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1970).
134. Patent Office Rules of Practice, Rule 47 (1953).
135. Id., Rule 47(b).
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the first five years of its availability. 136 Study of subsequent
precedent shows a similar pattern of infrequent use at the Patent
Office level.137 The same study shows there has been no infringe-
ment and validity litigation that raised the issue of whether a patent
maturing from an assignee - or coinventor - filed application is a
nullity. The constitutional implications of the statutory provisions
accordingly have not been considered in any court.
A word of caution is appropriate with respect to this lack of a
constitutional test. The Supreme Court long ago pointed out, in
Andrews v. Hovey, 135 that neither the administrative construction of
a federal patent statute over a substantial period of time, nor its
judicial construction in lower federal courts, can be regarded as
136. See Note, The Missing Inventor - An Analysis of Patent Prosecution Under
Rule 47 of the Patent Office Rules of Practice, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 419 (1958).
137. Cogar v. Schuyler, 464 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1972), uniquely involved an
assignee-filed application. In that case, the alleged inventor refused to execute the
application, because of his belief that "the invention was obvious to any skilled
electronic circuit designer," id. at 748, and sought to prevent issuance of a patent for
the same reason. In so doing he relied upon a purported right, under the fifth
amendment guarantee of procedural due process, to an oral hearing in the Patent
Office on the patentability issue. Id. at 750. The inventor failed to raise the far more
cogent questions of whether the application must constitutionally be deemed a nullity
because of his refusal to sign it, and whether § 118 of the 1952 Act and 37 C.F.R. 1.47
(1977) must be deemed unconstitutional if construed to permit an assignee to file an
application actively disapproved by the inventor.
In an opinion rendered on August 26,1977, written by Chief Judge Howard T.
Markey of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit departed sharply from existing
statutes and precedent to permit the nunc pro tunc correction by reissue, under § 251
of the 1952 Act, of a patent maturing from an application erroneously executed and
filed by the assignee, to substitute the true inventors as applicants. A. F. Stoddard &
Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The opinion ignores the strictures of law, 35
U.S.C. §§ 118, 251, 256 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975), and rule, at least of 37 C.F.R. 1.47, 1.56
(1977). No mention is made of the fact that the inventors never signed or swore to the
original application even though they were not missing or recalcitrant at the time of
filing. 564 F.2d at 562. No account is taken of the paramount rights of the public in
the patent system, which, inter alia, include an unmitigated right to free public
enjoyment of all illicitly patented and unpatented subject matter. For a list of cases
emphasizing this right, see note 3 supra. Ignoring this paramount public interest, the
opinion untenably assumed that no one would be harmed by permitting the correction
that allowed the patent to subsist. 564 F.2d at 565.
Building from this assumption, this confessed exercise in judicial legislation,
id. at 564, rests on two premises. The first and major of these premises is the
simplistic and questionable conclusion that under the Constitution, the sole "purpose
of the patent system is to encourage disclosures," id. at 563, a premise that does not
square with the Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the dominant public interest in
obtaining only valuable disclosures of meritorious information, and only in strict
accord with statutory strictures. See note 3 supra. The minor premise, which is
noncontroversial, but misapplied, is that the Constitution ordains "a patent system
based on justice, wherein honesty and candor are encouraged, not penalized." 564
F.2d at 563.
Properly applied, this premise would necessarily afford due respect to the
preeminent public interest in free access to information not validly patented. See note
3 supra.
138. 124 U.S. 694 (1888).
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authoritative absent concurring Supreme Court adjudication. 139 In
Andrews, the Court repudiated Patent Office rules in effect for 49
years to hold that public use or sale of a patented item more than
two years prior to the date of the application for a patent would
invalidate such patent regardless of whether or not the inventor had
consented to such use.140 Reasoning from Andrews, the need for
Supreme Court adjudication is more acute where constitutionality,
rather than mere interpretation of a federal patent statute, is at
stake.
The apparently unruffled existence enjoyed by sections 116, 118,
and 256 of the 1952 Patent Act for nearly twenty-five years
obviously cannot guarantee their constitutionality. The very fact
that there has been no opportunity for conclusive adjudication of the
meaning and scope, much less constitutionality, of these provisions
should alone give pause to Congress in its contemplation of the more
sweeping statutory inroads upon traditional concepts of inventor-
ship represented by the corporate patent concept. The possibility
that legislation enacting this concept might not be subject to
conclusive judicial test in the Supreme Court for many years, during
which large numbers of highly questionable corporate patents might
issue, should certainly deter the enactment of such legislation. At the
very least this broad proposed legislation should be tabled until after
meaningful adjudication of the related, but far less drastic, measures
now in effect under sections 116, 118, and 256 of the 1952 Act.
Legislation which would authorize the Patent Office to grant legions
of corporate patents of dubious validity in probable derogation of the
constitutional rights of the public is in the most virulent sense a
capitulation to "special interests. 14'
Whether or not the Supreme Court would, or could, hold
constitutional some or all of the limited provisions now in sections
116, 118, and 256 of the 1952 Act, it seems apparent that the
restricted congressional power of "securing for limited Times to...
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries"' 142 is not
sufficiently elastic to encompass the corporate patent concept,
including the redefinition of the word "Inventors" to embrace
assignees broadly.
143
139. Id. at 716.
140. Id. at 719.
141. See Scott & Unkovic, supra note 10, at 968-69. These knowledgeable authors
caution that Congress must use its own judgment, based on extended hearing and
study, and not permit "special interests" in any field, including patent legislation, "to
usurp the legislative function . . . to write the rules of the game . Id. at 969.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
143. See text accompanying notes 151-155 infra. Whether a watered down
assignee filing proposal of the scope included in Senate Bill 2255, S. 2255, 94th Cong.
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Over and above the probability that the corporate patent concept
would violate the patent clause, there has been little appreciation of
the potential fifth amendment clash. Legislation implementing the
corporate patent concept might well be deemed arbitrarily discrimi-
natory class legislation in violation of the fifth amendment.
Pointedly, the proposal envisioned by the Commission Report would
permit the inclusion in any patent having a plurality of inventors,
whether or not an assignee-filed patent, of claims directed to subject
matter invented by any number less than all of the full complement
of persons named as inventors. 144 Manifestly, a single patent
application, covering the distinct inventive contributions of a
plurality of inventor entities from among a large group of "joint"
inventors named on the application, could easily carve out a broader
scope of exclusivity for its assignee or joint owners than could
ordinarily be obtained from separate applications each presenting a
separate invention of each of the individual inventor entities
involved. The result would be rank discrimination against sole
inventors who could never obtain patents on more than they
invented or "pool" inventions to obtain broader coverage.145 To
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976), might be constitutional is a
closer question, but this seems doubtful in view of the bill's contemplation that the
inventor need not read or know the content of the application prior to filing. Id. § 111,
122 CONG. REc. 2383 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1976). See note 17 supra. It could be argued
that the bill's requirement of ratification and inventor's oath within two months of
filing would greatly reduce the incidence of problems resulting from the inventor's
failure to concur in the correctness or completeness of the application prepared at the
behest of his assignee.
It should be noted in this regard, however, that one group particularly
interested in obtaining permission for assignee filing - aliens desirous of applying
for patents pursuant to § 119 of the 1952 Act, 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), or
the parallel section of Senate Bill 2255, S. 2255, § 119, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) -
normally files applications, very close to the expiration of the one year grace period
for claiming the priority of a first-filed foreign application.
In consequence, the likelihood is great that many of them might lose any hope
of obtaining a United States patent if the original date, and the foreign priority dates,
were lost because the application was not ratified and accordingly became a nullity.
Foreign assignees, who are largely ignorant of, or disinterested in, American
constitutional law and the inventor's importance thereunder, could accordingly be
expected to employ coercive tactics quite unscrupulously to insure ratification and
preservation of the earliest possible filing date. Predictably, patents issued to these
entities would exhibit increased incidence of failure 1) to disclose the best mode known
to the inventor for carrying out his invention and 2) to particularly point out and
distinctly claim what the inventor regards as his invention, as required by § 112 of the
1952 Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. V 1975), and the parallel provision of Senate Bill 2255.
S. 2255, § 112, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
144. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
145. No possible difference between sole inventors and either joint inventors or
assignees could justify affording the latter two groups an opportunity for much
broader patent protection. For representative cases as to what constitutes discrimina-
tory class legislation, violative of the fifth amendment, see, e.g., Johnson v. Robinson,
415 U.S. 361 (1974); Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352 (1932); Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
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illustrate briefly the type of discrimination that would inevitably
occur from such legislation: Suppose that Inventor A, a corporate
employee member of a research "team," discovers a specific chemical
compound "X" which he identifies and determines to be useful, and
then turns over to Inventor B, a coworker, the task of ascertaining
whether a structurally closely related, but different, family of
compounds can also be made and used for similar purposes. Under
present law, 146 the prior invention of A is available prior art against
any later invention of B. Accordingly, A's work may prevent B from
receiving a patent, thus forcing B's purported invention into the
public domain at a very early date. Under the corporate patent
concept, however, A and B as coworkers employed by the same
assignee could file a joint application or be named as coinventors on
such an application filed by their assignee. This application would
be required, under the corporate patent concept, to present only one
"joint" claim to a "family" of compounds embracing both "X" and
B's group of related but different compounds. Its other claims could
separately cover A's invention and B's alleged invention. The Patent
Office would be effectively forestalled from rejecting the later B work
as unpatentable over the earlier A work because it would have no
practical way of discerning which came first, or of separating the
original A invention from the B invention. The resultant issuance of
a broad patent embracing the contributions of both A and B would
derogate the rights of the public. Since an independent inventor in
the same posture as A with respect to compound "X" could never
receive the same scope of patent grant as the corporate patent would
afford either to A and B jointly, or to their assignee, the
discriminatory effect is obvious. 147 Many other similar examples
146. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970). Section 103 prohibits the granting of a patent
though the invention is not identically disclosed or described ... if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.
Id.
147. For cases which hold that each of the inventors named on a patent must have
participated in the invention defined by the subject matter of each of its claims, see In
re Hamilton, 38 F.2d 889 (C.C.P.A. 1930); DeLaval Separator Co. v. Vermont Farm
Mach. Co., 135 F. 772 (2d Cir. 1904); Standard Computing Scale Co. v. Computing
Scale Co., 126 F. 639 (6th Cir. 1903); Rival Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Prods. Co., 358 F. Supp.
91 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Larsen Prods. Corp. v. Perfect Paint Prods. Inc., 191 F. Supp. 303
(D. Md. 1961); R. K. LeBlond Mach. Tool Co. v. Wickes Bros., 23 F. Supp. 371, 376 (E.D.
Mich. 1937). The case law is consistent with the Patent Office rule existing from 1869
to 1949 which precluded "independent inventors of separate ... improvements in the
same machine" from obtaining a joint patent on their separate inventions. Rules of
Practice in Patent Cases, Rule 3 (1869). See note 110 supra.
In In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1964), it was noted, albeit ruefully,
that "the patent could not legally contain a claim to Sarett's sole invention under
1976-19771 1117
33
Sears: The Corporate Patent - Reform or Retrogression
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 22: p. 1085
could be envisioned. The abuses become more aggravated as
"inventor" groups are enlarged, increasing the possible permuta-
tions of inventor subgroups and the number of inventions to be
joined in a single application.
It can be argued that the statutory permission to so amalgamate
the work of different entities would not change the substantive law
defining patentable subject matter as now set forth in sections 101,
102, and 103 of the 1952 Act, 148 absent a clear statement of statutory
intent to do so. Pursuing that argument, the above postulated joint
patent of A and B would be granted by the Patent Office at the
assignee's peril. The argument is defective because it assumes
litigation to be inevitable and further assumes that the true facts
would then necessarily be exposed. In actual practice, however,
litigation might never ensue. And if it did, disentanglement of
complex facts relating to individual inventorship years after the
event, when memories have faded, research team members have
dispersed or died, and written records may be less than satisfactory
to show anything beyond the specifics of experimental work
performed, is no simple matter.
Notably, the proposal for amalgamation of many corporate
employees' inventions in one composite patent application origi-
nated prior to the appointment of the President's Commission, in
suggestions of practicing corporate employee patent lawyers. 149 One
of these individuals has recently acknowledged the intention of these
suggestions - to permit corporations to avoid rejection of a patent
application filed by one corporate inventor entity on grounds of
unpatentability over an earlier application describing an earlier




existing law because it would not have been the invention of the joint patentees." Id.
at 1010 n.7 (emphasis in original).
One article has incorrectly asserted that Senate Bill 2255 would change
current law because "[i]t would require each of the joint inventors to have made an
inventive contribution to the subject matter of each claim of the application." Whale,
Patent Law Revision - A Dark Look at S. 2255, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 153, 157 (1977).
This statement is not only incorrect but may reveal more than the author intended
about the real impetus behind the corporate patent - the legitimization of a
practice already being illicitly used by some corporate employee patent practitioners
to the detriment of the public.
148. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
149. See Commentaria, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 301 (1964) (letter from Louis Altman
to editors, suggesting changes in patent law to permit joint applications for
contributors to an invention); Commentaria, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 655 (1963) (letter
from Bernard Franz to editors, suggesting § 116 be modified to permit inclusion as
joint applicants those making some inventive contribution to claims of the applica-
tion).
150. Franz, Prosecution Problems With A Plurality Of Inventions From A Single
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An even more recent proposal by a member of the Board of
Patent Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office' 51 would
approach the corporate patent less directly by amending sections
102(e) and (g) of the 1952 Act - and presumably, by implication, at
least sections 102(a) and 103 also - to prohibit the citation as prior
art of the work of one research team member against an application
filed by a coworker. 152 Reference to the example above demonstrates
that this proposal would discriminate against both the sole
independent inventor and the public. Pointedly, the sole inventor
would be disadvantaged in relation to corporate team inventors,
because all prior art would continue to apply against his patent
applications. 153 And the public would more often be defrauded of the
unfettered right to use imitative technology failing to meet the
constitutional criterion that patented subject matter must "promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."'51 4 The Supreme Court
predictably would not ultimately tolerate a legislative relaxation in
the constitutional patentability standard, particularly one that
would enlarge the ambit of patent protection available to special
interests in the corporate field.
155
With the increasing complexity of modern research and development, it
frequently happens that a single project spawns several inventions. Such
projects usually require a group effort, and the resulting inventions are not all
contributed by the same "inventive entity." However, it may be difficult or
impossible to select an invention for filing, and write an application disclosing
only matter contributed by a single "inventive entity." It is also usually
impractical to file applications on all of the inventions on the same day. If the
attorney proceeds in what would seem to be a normal manner, and files several
applications over a period of time, then the provision of 35 U.S.C. 102(e) is likely
to be used to reject the later filed applications on the disclosure of a patent issued
on one or more of the earlier filed applications.
Id. at 559 (footnote omitted). This author has failed to consider the constitutional
implications of his suggestion, and appears blind to the bias against sole inventors
that is necessarily implicit in the scheme.
For additional treatments of the use under present law of earlier filed
applications of corporate employees as prior art against subsequently filed applica-
tions of their research team coworkers, see Lorenzo, The Inventive Entity and the
Law of Double Patenting, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 519 (1968); Meyer, Obvious
Differences - What Should the Points of Reference Be?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 516
(1973); Pitlick, A Proposed Compromise to the "Prior Act" Controversy Surrounding
In re Hellsund and In re Bass, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 699 (1974); Rosenstock, Prior Art
Under 35 U.S.C., Section 103 Includes Prior Invention, 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 263
(1974).
151. Witherspoon, So-Called Common Assignee Double Patenting - An Issue In
Search For A Home, 4 APLA Q.J. 329 (1976).
152. Id. at 348-49.
153. See notes 144-145 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
155. See Sears, Tinkering With the Invention Standard: No Solution to Problems of
Patent Quality, 59 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1975). See also Sears, Combination Patents and
35 U.S.C. § 103, 1977 DET. L. REV. 83.
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V. CONCLUSION
Summing up, it seems clear that statutory deemphasization of
the inventor's role in the United States patent system is not only
unconstitutional per se, but would tend to deemphasize the
inventor's product - the invention itself - and attenuate the high
standard it must attain to merit a valid patent under present law.
156
In this day of persistent lip service to the "lone," independent
inventor, whose financial plight is repeatedly urged as the justifica-
tion for makeshift patching together of our antiquated patent
granting procedure in lieu of adopting a truly modernized inter
partes procedure, it is indeed ironic that his loudest self-styled
sympathizers and admirers are also most persistent in seeking and
supporting the corporate patent proposal. 157 Certainly it is hard to
envision provisions more discriminatorily destructive of the relative
value of a "lone" inventor's patent rights than those embodied in
this clearly unconstitutional and well-nigh medievally regressive
proposal.
Quite apart from constitutional considerations, moreover, if the
lone inventor and the sole employed inventor continue to be
important in the generation of fresh new technical ideas, infused
with outstanding originality and creativity, and of a character
crucial to real advancement of the arts and sciences - and many
knowledgeable people assert that they are158 - it is particularly
156. This conclusion follows from the fact that joint inventors, by pooling many
distinct but related inventions in one case, could easily avoid citing pertinent prior art
which originated in their own laboratories, in derogation of the invention standard
consistently recognized and demanded by the Supreme Court. See Irons & Sears,
supra note 71; Sears, Tinkering With The Invention Standard: No Solution to
Problems of Patent Quality, 59 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1975).
157. For example, one writer has suggested that a modernized patent reform bill
designed to improve patent quality, inter alia, by permitting public participation in
the patent granting process, in contrast to the present outmoded practice of secret, ex
parte dealings between the Patent Office and the patent application owner, would
result in "fewer applications filed, particularly by private inventors and small
companies." Whale, supra note 147, at 162.
Mr. Whale, a former American Patent Law Association president, thus joins
the Association's official position that a modernized patent granting procedure is
undesirable because it is too costly for most "lone" inventors. Id. See, e.g., Letter from
Edward F. McKie, then President of American Patent Law Association, to The
Honorable James O. ,Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
(Feb. 3, 1976). This letter criticized Senate Bill 2255 because "individuals and small
companies are more in need of the patent incentive than larger companies, yet are less
able to afford added expense." Id., reprinted in 1976 BULL. AM. PAT. L.A. 7, 78.
158. For a sampling of articles suggesting that "team" work not only fails to
substitute for individual originality, but may even have a depressive effect on
creativity, see Blizard, The Future of Discovery and Invention, 56 TECH. REV. 395
(1954); Chandler, Duplicate Inventions?. 62 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 495 (1960); da
Silva, Invention as Creative Art, 5 CHEMTECH 520 (1975); Hayes, The Independent
Inventor's Interest, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 298 (1965); Land, Thinking Ahead, 37 HARV.
Bus. REV. 7 (1959); Ooms, Patents, Small Business, and the Age of Research, 40 J.
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important that patent legislation should not demean their individual
dignity or erode their morale. 159 The corporate patent proposal, by
depersonalizing and deemphasizing their role in the patent system,
would necessarily have such an effect.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5 (1958); Reynolds, Problem Solving and the Creative Process, 15
M.S.U. Bus. Topics 7 (No. 4, 1967); Stedman, The Employed Inventor, The Public
Interest, and Horse and Buggy Law in the Space Age, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1970); Note,
The Inventor, Vanishing American, FORBES MAGAZINE, Dec. 15, 1951, at 12.
159. One author suggested that even corporate employee research "team"
inventors would feel a decline in their morale. Bangs, supra note 22, at 1007.
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